

Part of a global network to abolish nuclear weapons early in the new century

# Europe and NPT 2005

There exists an obligation  
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear  
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

*International Court of Justice,  
8 July 1996*

Il existe une obligation de poursuivre de bonne foi  
et de mener à terme des négociations conduisant au désarmement nucléaire dans  
tous ses aspects, sous un contrôle international strict et efficace

*Cour Internationale de Justice,  
8 juillet 1996*

## **EUROPE AND NPT 2005**

### **SUMMARY**

Adopted by the UN in 1968 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a surprisingly short document considering its universal weight. The NPT is essentially a disarmament treaty in its own right ( Item 3) as well as the keystone of the global régime to contain and then eliminate nuclear weapons. It is reproduced in full for this package (Item 2).

This package has been prepared for a Round Table of Non-Governmental Organisations and Parliamentarians at the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) in Brussels on 24 June. The objective is to explore ways of working together for a successful outcome to the crucial NPT Review Conference in 2005. The event will take place at the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) in Brussels on 24 June. We also hope to discuss how we might raise awareness of the issue of nuclear weapons among the peoples of Europe and their leaders, and to emphasise the vital importance of maintaining and developing the NPT.

The Brussels Round Table follows hard on 2003 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting (PrepCom). These meetings take place in the years between the five-yearly Review Conferences. The reports by Nigel Chamberlain and Senator Douglas Roche (Items 6 & 7) confirm that, once again, very little real progress was made towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. This is all the more disappointing in view of the encouraging progress made at the 2000 Review Conference with the adoption of the "Programme of Action" towards nuclear disarmament, thanks, largely, to the work of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) (Items 4 & 5).

Meanwhile, what of Europe? In Item 8 Ken Coates argues for a centre of resistance to the "Full Spectrum Dominance" now adopted by the U.S. and its marginalisation of treaty obligations (Item 7). Dan Plesch (Item 9) provides details for a spirited and hopeful alternative to a world drifting towards nuclear proliferation. However, Karel Koster points out that there is a strain of thought in the EU which sees partnership with the U.S. as both inevitable and benign.(Items 10 & 11).

Senator Roche emphasises the important of public opinion pointing out that nuclear disarmament " lies rather flat and flabby in the list of public concerns". How can Nuclear Weapons be as much in the forefront of the public's mind as other issues, such as SARS, house prices and terrorism? The research carried out by the UK Nuclear Weapons Awareness Group (Items 12 & 13) is a step towards answering this question.

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# **THE TREATY**

## **ITEM 1**

### **THE MEANING OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY**

Extract from the introduction to a booklet produced for the Preparatory Committee for the 2005

NPT PrepCom Geneva, 28 April -9 May 2003.

Felicity Hill and Dimity Hawkins, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*,  
*Reaching Critical Will* Outreach Coordinator.

... the umbrella treaty under which so many others find vital shelter and strength.

With the support of all but four of the world's governments, the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is the umbrella treaty under which so many others find vital shelter and strength. The treaty is not without its problems and limitations, but in terms of an international tool for progressive disarmament, it is of key importance.

For over 30 years now the NPT has required nuclear disarmament under Article VI. In these 30 years the world has seen a massive change in attitude towards nuclear weapons and the disproportionate threat posed by a handful of countries. Major international bodies such as the International Court of Justice have made unequivocal statements on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. World-wide protests have seen nuclear weapons testing come to a virtual standstill in most areas of the world. There continues to be strong debates around the farcical notion of "deterrence" and its contribution to proliferation.

Nuclear weapons arsenals have been reduced by almost half their Cold War levels, although smaller arsenals have been upgraded to wield an even larger destructive power. And in amongst all of this we have seen a strengthening role for non-government organizations in discussions around non-proliferation and in developing models for peace keeping and conflict resolution.

At the sixth NPT Review Conference held in 2000, governments reached consensus for the first time in 15 years. Thanks to the catalytic work of the New Agenda Coalition, many non-nuclear weapons states that have kept the bargain of the NPT in not acquiring nuclear bombs, were emboldened to demand more from the five nuclear weapon states. The 13 point action plan for disarmament is at heart of the successful but hard won consensus, and is the path carved out by 187 governments towards the total elimination of the suicidal, genocidal and ecocidal nuclear weapon.

We have much to celebrate but also a great deal of work to do in turning words to actions. ...

What lies before us in the lead up to 2005 is an opportunity to set goals for the future, to hold our governments accountable to those promises made in the 2000 Review Conference and those implicit in the text of the Treaty itself. As we face 2005 we work to ensure that the key promise of the 2000 Review Conference - the 'unequivocal undertaking' to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals - is met.

**ITEM 2**

**TREATY ON THE NON-  
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow

July 1, 1968

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate

March 13, 1969

U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow

March 5, 1970

Proclaimed by

U.S. President March 5, 1970

**Declaring** their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

**The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",**

**Considering** the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

**Believing** that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

**In conformity** with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

**Undertaking** to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

**Expressing** their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

**Affirming** the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

**Convinced** that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

**Declaring** their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

**Urging** the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

**Recalling** the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

**Desiring** to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between the States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

**Recalling** that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

**Have agreed as follows:**

**Article I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

## **Article II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

## **Article III**

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

## **Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

## **Article V**

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

## **Article VI**

**Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.**

## **Article VII**

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

## **Article VIII**

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall

enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

#### **Article IX**

**1.** This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

**2.** This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

**3.** This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.

**4.** For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

**5.** The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

**6.** This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

#### **Article X**

**1.** Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**2.** Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

#### **Article XI**

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty, DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.**

### **ITEM 3**

## **THE PRIMACY OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT**

A presentation at

*"Steps Towards Nuclear Disarmament"*,

Geneva,

2 May 2002

George Farebrother, Secretary, World Court Project UK

" ... the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery ..."

The five recognised nuclear weapon states and their allies still claim that nuclear disarmament is not required until the utopian mirage of general and complete disarmament is achieved. This view could be reinforced by one section of the preamble to the NPT which refers to "*... the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control*". Article VI, however, suggests two separate aims: "*... nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control*". If we are to assume that the interpretation of any treaty must accord with its purposes, then the NPT is clearly about nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. It is only incidentally about "general and complete disarmament". The preamble is full of commentary on nuclear weapons and their elimination: "*Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war ...*", "*... the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery*", and "*Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament...*".

Any doubt about the meaning of Article VI was removed in 1996 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, decided unanimously that "*There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control*". The obligation is about nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons only.

The Year 2000 NPT Final Document with its Programme of Action does not carry the force of law in the same way as the NPT itself. It is not a Treaty. It is, however, a solemn political obligation. Significantly, it supports the ICJ's conclusion by separating nuclear from "general" disarmament. In July 2000 Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, (quoting para 17/6 of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Sixth Review Conference), said "*In contrast to their customary practice of referring only to an 'ultimate goal', the nuclear-weapon States made an 'unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.' This pledge, moreover, was not expressly conditioned upon the prior achievement of general and complete disarmament.*"

## **ITEM 4**

### **THE NEW AGENDA AND THE NPT PROGRAMME OF ACTION**

"We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament".

On 9 June 1998 the New Agenda Coalition, (NAC) - Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden - published a Joint Declaration which criticised both the "official" nuclear weapon states and the three "unofficial" nuclear weapons-capable states of India, Israel and Pakistan, and appealed to them to agree immediately on practical steps for moving quickly to zero nuclear weapons. Initially, the leaders of the nuclear states must commit themselves to this task without reservation.

In 1998 and 1999 the New Agenda Resolution, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" was adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) with large majorities. However, the NATO nuclear states voted against and the UK delegate explained that the Resolution would be "incompatible with the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent".

Due to intensive lobbying by the New Agenda States there was an important step forward at the NPT Review Conference in April-May 2000. The Final Document, agreed to by all NPT states contained an *"unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament ..."* plus a 13-step Programme of Action for the next five years to implement this. The 13 steps were not meant to be carried out one by one in order; they are complementary and reinforcing. The Programme of Action also gave diplomatic weight to the July 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons which stated "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

UN resolutions are not legally binding; but they set norms and indicate the level of political will by governments to carry out their disarmament obligations. Since 2000 the NAC has worked to develop this political will.

Canadian Senator **Douglas Roche** reports that at the 2003 PrepCom the NAC introduced a Working Paper, which said:

*"We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament"*.

The NAC called for multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances to be given by the five NWS. The Coalition also urged more unilateral reductions and the formalization of such reductions in legally binding agreements ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility. Further reduction of tactical nuclear weapons should be a priority.

The NAC, which has been reaching out to NATO Non-Nuclear Weapon States to get support for its resolutions at the U.N. First Committee, made some headway at the PrepCom in linking with Germany's concerns that tactical nuclear weapons have not yet been given a priority in disarmament talks. And a Working Paper, submitted by Austria, Mexico and Sweden explicitly called for the U.S. and Russia to include tactical nuclear weapons within the framework of the Moscow Treaty.



## **ITEM 5**

### **THE PROMISES OF THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Summarised by *Reaching Critical Will*

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament were agreed to by all governments signed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

#### **1. Signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ( CTBT)**

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT.

#### **2. Stopping Testing**

A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

#### **3. Negotiation**

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

#### **4. Negotiation**

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

#### **5. No Going Back**

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

#### **6. Abolishing Nukes**

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

#### **7. Implementing Existing Treaties**

The early entry into force and full implementation of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

## **8. Implementing Existing Treaties**

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

## **9. Step by Step...**

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

## **10. Stopping the Production of Plutonium**

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

## **11. General and Complete Disarmament**

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

## **12. Reporting**

Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

## **13. Verifying**

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

*A great deal of Information on the NPT is on the Reaching Critical Will Web Site on*

*<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/>*

*The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which includes the*

*Programme of Action, is available on*

*<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/2000FD.pdf>*

# **THE PREPCOM: WHAT NOW?**

## **THE NUCLEAR NON- PROLIFERATION TREATY PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING**

**Geneva, 28 April 28-**

**9 May 2003.**

### ***ITEM 6***

#### **DID ANYBODY NOTICE THE DISCUSSIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA?**

Nigel Chamberlain, *British American Security Information Council (BASIC)*

... unless the general publics and elected representatives in the nuclear weapons states become more informed and vociferous on this issue, then there is little chance of turning these 'talking shops' into genuine disarmament ...

Did anybody notice the discussions on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in Geneva? For two weeks, the UN photocopyers at the Palais des Nations overlooking Lake Geneva disgorged reams of paper for the distribution of speeches and position papers on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. But just how important were the deliberations of the 188 member states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? Who showed any interest in their outcome on Friday afternoon, May 9? And what impact are they likely to have in the real world?

To the delegations who actively participated on behalf of their national governments and to the ranks of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) granted limited access to the proceedings, such meetings (known as PrepComs, which take place in the intervening years between the five-yearly NPT Review Conferences) are viewed as a mixture of formalised sparring, an opportunity to get views and opinions on the record and a rather ineffectual talking shop.

The NPT was generally accepted in 1970 as the best means available for both preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament. 33 years later neither objective has been achieved, despite notable successes along the way. Worryingly, faith in the eventual full implementation of the NPT's historic agreement is on the wane while some nations are clearly making alternative plans and arrangements.

Meanwhile, the three nuclear weapons states remaining defiantly outside the treaty (Israel, India and Pakistan) have recently been joined by its first defector - the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. Not yet with a confirmed nuclear weapon capability, many analysts believe North Korea is well down

the path trodden by the three 'outsiders' and the five 'declared' nuclear powers (US, Russia, UK, France and China). The 'declared' nuclear weapons states continue to demonstrate their unwillingness to divest themselves of the very capability they hypocritically deny to other states. It is this unwillingness on the part of nuclear weapon states to seriously address their own disarmament commitments, combined with the new post-September 11 counter-proliferation strategies of the United States, that is contributing to both 'nuclear 'breakout' and the treaty's declining legitimacy. The Chairman's 10 page factual summary of the two-week paper chase around the conference halls of the Palais, was a diplomatic triumph of compromise phrases and subliminal messages. Nevertheless, there was a round of ritualised, but polite rebuttals for it being both too bland for some and too critical for others.

The most significant paragraph of Ambassador Laszlo Molnar's factual summary came very near the beginning when he reaffirmed that each article of the NPT is "binding on all member states at all times and in all circumstances" and the imperative that all member states be held accountable with respect to their strict compliance with all their obligations. The other side of this obligation coin is suggested further down the opening page as he reminds member states that they had expressed their readiness to reinforce the efficiency of the NPT by coming down more heavily on reported cases of non-compliance.

## **ITEM 7**

### **"RITUALISTIC FAÇADE"**

Conclusion Of the Report and Assessment of the 2003 NPT PrepCom

by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C. Chairman, *Middle Powers Initiative*

There are so many crises in the world that the nuclear weapons issue seems remote. Even educators seem perplexed by the immensity of the issue.

Because it had to appeal to all delegations, the Chairman's Factual Summary, negotiated among delegations in private meetings, was bland and certainly not a ringing call to action. The governments are so deeply divided on the issue of nuclear weapons that it would be unrealistic to think that problems which extend beyond the NPT itself can be resolved by the limited authority of a PrepCom. The issue of compliance with the NPT is less one of technical considerations and more one of the philosophy of power. The five permanent members of the Security Council exercise a hegemony over the rest of the world through their power, which is sustained by their possession of nuclear weapons. If they were sincere about living up to the fundamental bargain of the NPT, they would have acted - in a joint and collaborative manner - to shut down the nuclear weapons enterprises that they foster. They have had plenty of time to do this. And they have been given many citations for action, not least by the International Court of Justice.

Now the non-proliferation regime is further threatened by the emergence of a new ideology aimed at disbanding arms control and disarmament treaties. The ABM and the CTBT are but two examples. The diminishment of the qualitative value of the 13 Practical Steps undermines the protestations of an "unequivocal undertaking" to total elimination. The NPT is thus in a shaky state today, but it can only be strengthened by outside forces. The call for U.N. Security Council action at the Summit level maybe a start, even if such a meeting were to begin with only a limited interpretation of what "non-proliferation" truly means. At least the discussion would be lifted out of the ritual of the NPT process. Left to itself in the present atmosphere, the NPT will fall apart. It simply cannot hold together in one compact two such divisive views and sets of actors. If the atmosphere were to change, then the NPT could make genuine progress because it has already shown a tremendous capacity for handling all the technical questions contained within the drive for nuclear disarmament. In the end, the fundamental question - do nations want to achieve nuclear disarmament - can only be answered by the governments concerned.

Here the question of public opinion, as Dhanapala has repeatedly said, will be a determining factor. Will the publics manifest to their political leaders their aversion to nuclear weapons, and make governments respond to deeply held feelings of the immorality, illegality and sheer danger of the continued possession of nuclear weapons? The answer to that question is uncertain. Though publics around the world manifested their aversion to war in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, they have been largely silent on the nuclear weapons issue. While public opinion polls have shown that people generally would like to get rid of nuclear weapons, there has not been a vibrant expression of that opinion. It lies rather flat and flabby in the list of public concerns. There are so many crises in the world that the nuclear weapons issue seems remote. Even educators seem perplexed by the immensity of the issue.

Yet the world is inexorably moving to some form of nuclear warfare. That this should be happening in what has been termed the "Post-Cold War" era is a paradox of immense consequences. The questions of political power and the rule of law must be addressed if the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to play its part in world safety. These questions are essentially moral ones. People do understand moral issues. When they understand the moral consequences of present trendlines, they will not put up with the ritualistic façade that the NPT review process has become.

*Senator Roche's full report is on <http://www.web.net/~cnanw/droche.pdf>*

## **ITEM 8**

### **DEALING WITH THE HYDRA?**

"Proliferation and Full Spectrum Dominance"

(slightly shortened)

Ken Coates,

*Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.*

June 2003

... non-proliferation cannot be abandoned without enthroning brute force. But real disarmament is the overcoming of force.

*The horror scenarios of the Cold War have disappeared, but the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has not. Like the monstrous Hydra of Greek mythology, modern weapons of mass destruction are sprouting new heads faster than anybody can cut them off.*

So wrote Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland respectively, in an article in The International Herald Tribune, whose title gives their answer to the threat: "Slaying the Hydra - together". As they conclude:

"Even Hercules could not kill the many headed monster alone. Only by acting together will we safeguard the security of all."

In spite of strenuous combined efforts, the hydra of proliferation remains very much with us, and it has certainly not been caged by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The recent NPT preparatory conference, held in Geneva, between April 28th and May 9th 2003, resounded with reproaches, notably those of the United States against North Korea and Iran. The Americans were also most concerned about the possibility that Libya might become a proliferator. Delegates in Geneva will have been actively wondering how far these kinds of proliferation match the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the phantasms for which the British-American coalition went to war, and which have totally eluded the occupiers of Iraq.

None of us should be surprised that the United States has been fixated by the question of horizontal proliferation, and almost oblivious to that of vertical proliferation, which is likely to provoke the sharpest concern when the next Review Conference of the Treaty takes place in the year 2005.

At the full-scale NPT Review Conference of 2000, thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament had been agreed. These were designed to satisfy non-proliferating objectors that the apparent immunity of the nuclear powers to Treaty action for actual disarmament would, by agreement, be ended. But in 2002, at the earlier Preparatory Conference in New York, the American Ambassador declared that he no longer supported many of the conclusions which had been agreed two years earlier.

During the two years of the Bush administration which had seen the modification of American views on these thirteen practical steps, a marked swing to unilateralism had affected numerous other areas of United States policy. Unilaterally, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; it declined to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which had been signed by 164 nations; it had caused the ousting of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In lesser disarmament decisions, the United States had also rejected the

Landmine Treaty of 1997, endorsed by 122 Member-states, which meant that anti-personnel bombs, banned by most countries, could be used by American forces in the bombardment of Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and in the second Iraq war. Additionally, the USA had been alone among nations in opposing an agreement in the United Nations to restrict international trade in small arms. Of course, the Bush administration also rejected the Kyoto Agreement and forced the resignation of the Chairman of the United Nations Panel on Climate Change because his views were disapproved in the administration. And the United States not only opposed the creation of the International Criminal Court, but demanded immunity from prosecution for all American citizens.

The thrust of unilateralism has intensified the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in the development of smaller, "usable" weapons designed to implement the new military doctrines which were being developed. These consistently undermine the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, partly by requiring ever more horrific conventional armaments. It could be argued that the distinction is further undermined by the category "weapons of mass destruction", which takes the focus off specifically nuclear explosives. In this context, we now hear of a new generation of low-yield and "bunker-busting" nuclear weapons, to match recent developments in high-powered conventional bombs. ...

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was fundamentally a voluntary engagement by signatory States who forswear the development of their own nuclear weapons, and reliance on nuclear arms. But a significant part of the shift in United States policy to "going it alone" has been the abandonment of the language of non-proliferation, and the substitution of an apparently similar, but in fact diametrically opposed, language of "counter-proliferation".

Counter-proliferation is not a voluntary engagement, but a policy of compulsion, which can be prayed in aid against States which are, or are thought to be, considering the acquisition of nuclear armaments or other so-called "weapons of mass destruction", particularly chemical and biological weapons. Up to now, this policy has been slowly crystallising. For example, although the United States has expressed its disapproval of the decision of Pakistan and India to acquire nuclear warheads, there has been no threat to compulsorily disarm either country. Of course there has also been scant recognition and no threat whatever, to effect the nuclear disarmament of Israel, which is believed to have a very large nuclear arsenal, including thermo-nuclear warheads. ... However, States designated by the United States as rogue States have all been the subject of threatening messages, outstanding cases being those of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. ...

It has been argued that the biggest shock to the non-proliferation regime has been the formal repudiation, by North Korea, of its adherence to the NPT. But, in the words of one commentator: "At least as damaging as North Korea's departure have been successive moves by Washington to distance itself from nuclear disarmament. In the run up to the Iraq war, the US President, George Bush, signed National Security Presidential Directive 17, which said: the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including potentially nuclear weapons - to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States ..."

The significance of this directive is not simply that it marks a higher level of bellicosity than has been customary among nuclear powers: it also constitutes a serious undermining of the non-proliferation regime, by removing the "negative security assurances" made by all nuclear powers to NPT non-nuclear signatories in 1978. This was indeed strengthened in 1995 by the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 984, committing the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapon States.



These commitments were of some considerable importance in encouraging what has been perhaps the most positive step against proliferation, the development of nuclear-free zones over wide areas of the earth's surface. Without the guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, it may be increasingly difficult to persuade non-nuclear States that they will gain any advantage by maintaining their commitment to non-proliferation.

This commitment had been strained already by the time of the NPT Review Conference of 2000, which is why the thirteen practical steps which the US Government is now questioning, were needed to keep the show on the road. Non-proliferators were absolutely impatient with the continued assumption of the nuclear powers that their own weapons were in a special category, beyond the reach of disarmament measures which would only apply to lesser mortals. ...

To the extent that the NPT, and reliance on voluntarism, have been weakened, it is not surprising that we hear more and more talk about counter-proliferation. This implies a policeman, and only one such policeman has presented itself on the scene. The United States military preponderance is intuited by all, and the various wars which have been launched in recent years have all served to underline that message. Military preponderance has in fact been codified in official American military doctrine. In the years before the recognition of President Bush's unilateral policies, it was already stated, for instance in the US Space Command Vision for 2020, which opens with the claim:

*"US Space Command - dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict."*

This pretension is backed by some explicit reasoning:

*"The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance. Space forces play an increasingly critical role in providing situational awareness (e.g. global communications; precise navigation; timely and accurate missile warning and weather; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to US forces."*

Space doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and personnel will evolve to fully realize the potential of space power. Space power is a vital element in moving towards the Joint Vision goal of being persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and pre-eminent in any form of conflict."

The plain military version of Full Spectrum Dominance *"implies that US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronised operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains - space, sea, land, air, and information. Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power world-wide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance."*

With the visible and indeed spectacular augmentation of American military power, even before the rise of overt unilateralism under the Bush administration, we can easily see why there has been more talk about counter-proliferation, where persuasion has been seen to give place to direct compulsion.

However, military power is not everything, and subject nations in a complex and integrated modern world can find a variety of ways of containing militarism. ...

However, the lesson of the war in Iraq is that the world is very far from uni-polar. New military alliances will probably form because the material economic interests of France, Germany and Russia will require a counter lobby to that of the USA. (In the wings, waits China, not yet seen as a part of any axis of evil, but neither yet seen as an acceptable world partner.)

... But the military cannot do many necessary things. Often, it seems, it cannot maintain the basic fabric of civil society. The civil power came first, and may even have the last laugh. No doubt the conflict between the United States and Iraq was exacerbated by the decision of Saddam Hussein to

trade oil for Euros instead of Dollars. The heightened tension in Saudi Arabia and the continued pressure on Iran, may quickly persuade the two other major oil exporters to do the same. Already Venezuela is moving in that direction. So, the good soldier Schweik may get his revenge.

If oil is traded in Euros, then petro-dollars will no longer bridge the yawning gap in the United States balance of trade, and it will be necessary for the Americans to vastly increase their exports, or reduce their imports, in order to reach a balance. Full Spectrum Dominance financed by petro-dollars will be a thing of the past, and the fate of the Soviet Union, which over-reached itself because successive Soviet Governments spent more and more on military technology at the expense of popular contentment, may yet visit the United States.

Even so, the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a serious danger. Yes, weaker nuclear powers may well be visited by thieves and terrorists who wish to find the means of punishing their adversaries. For some years the major fear was that the Russians might not be able to control their crumbling nuclear arsenals. If economic weakness overtakes the world's solitary megapower, who dare argue that this pattern may not recur?

But all this is somewhat speculative. What has already left the area of speculation is the fact that what Donald Rumsfeld calls "old Europe" is finding a necessity for closer diplomatic and military co-operation. An alignment with Russia is already likely. Miscalled "new Europe" may well seek closer affinities with the United States, based largely on ancient ideological prejudice and modern nationalism. None of the parties threaten a "New Cold War": ideology is absent, but conflicts of interest are not. For this reason, the economic future of Rumsfeld's new Europe is far more likely to turn on its relations with Germany and France than it is to prosper from transatlantic aid. There is no pot of gold or Marshall Plan which will relieve Eastern Europe's needs: so the resurgence of Nato on an Eastern basis is likely to be more an affair of trumpets and drums, not to say flags, of which there will be an abundance, than it is of serious and sustained military power. Nato is founded on a Treaty, and its members therefore have rights, which sit ill with unilateral policies by the senior partner. The planting of impressive new bases will not consolidate, but aggravate, this redivision of Europe's military space. A new set of alignments is emerging, perhaps reluctantly, but driven by a powerful sense of necessity, from the turmoil which has recently hit Iraq. The effects of that turmoil are likely to be even more profound than the dire effects of coalition policies on Mesopotamia.

All these speculations serve only to show that vertical proliferation is still both possible and likely to continue. Horizontal proliferation may be thought to have been deterred by the adoption of policies to "counter" it by the megapower: but to the extent that these encourage duplicity, they will merely make more difficult its detection. There can of course be endless attempts to restrict the spread of nuclear technology, and its refinement into ever more damaging areas, but so complex is this territory that more and more of us are coming to the conclusion that the simple solution is the most practical one. In the words of General Lee Butler, formerly of the United States Air Force, "*standing down nuclear arsenals requires only a fraction of the ingenuity and resources that were devoted to their creation*". General Butler was following in the footsteps of another distinguished military man, Lord Mountbatten.

*"As a military man who has given half a century of active Service, I say in all sincerity that the nuclear arms race has no military purpose. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of the illusions which they have generated. There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept ...if you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense, and I repeat - it is a disastrous misconception to believe that by increasing the total uncertainty, one increases one's own certainty."*

Butler's conclusion is that “a global consensus that ... nuclear weapons have no defensible role ... is not only possible, it is imperative.”

It is understandable that the investment of a prodigious treasure gives an institution the semblance of permanence and indestructibility. To imagine all that to be dispensable, indeed to think we could be better off without it, is widely described as “utopian”. But this utopian decision is more practical by far than the endless pursuit of lesser agreements to regulate powers, which continually escape all efforts to confine them. The price of establishing a controlling agency strong enough and extensive enough to enforce counter-proliferation could all-too-easily be the price of universal enslavement, and the enthronement of one power over all. A movement to disarm all, by contrast, enfranchises all who participate, and is by its nature pluralistic and inclusive.

Of course, if such a great human resistance begins to emerge, Anna Lindh and Erkki Tuomioja will remain right throughout all the interregnum before it takes effect. Short of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation cannot be abandoned without enthroning brute force. But real disarmament is the overcoming of force.

Hercules had the very great advantage that he was a God. But some of us think it is a disadvantage that he is also a myth. If we want to solve our problems we must do it ourselves.

# EUROPE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

## ITEM 9

### EUROPE IS THE KEY

Dan Plesch , senior research fellow at the *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*.  
The Guardian,

January 8, 2003

Europe should lead the world in weapons management and elimination. Tony Blair and George Bush have named weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat to our societies, and yet neither proposes any plan for eliminating the threat.

While the US military budget alone is now \$380bn, the nations of the world cannot even find one thousandth of that to sustain the \$330m budget that the International Atomic Energy Agency needs to check up on nuclear materials. Its representative spoke at the UN in the aftermath of September 11 and complained, in the restrained style of international bureaucracy, that:

"This review of some of the IAEA's activities makes it clear that the scope of our work continues to expand. In the environment of zero real growth budgets, to which the agency has been subjected for over a decade, some of these priorities cannot be accommodated.

"The compromises achieved to date to resolve near-term budget issues should not be mistaken for long-term solutions. If the agency is to fulfil its mandate while maintaining the required balance among its priority activities, we must find better ways to ensure adequate and predictable funding. We must also have the foresight, when planning our activities, to invest in preventive measures rather than simply responding to crises - when it is often too late and much more costly."

Looking ahead into the middle of the century, where do current trends with weapons of mass destruction take us? A number of possible futures present themselves. One is where US hegemony presides over a relatively stable state of armaments and where potential adversaries have been either cajoled or bombed into acquiescence. Another is one where there is sporadic use of weapons of mass destruction in western cities and between third world nations and nations seek succour in missiles and anti-missile systems.

Japan and the European Union develop their own nuclear weapons. We learn to live with it.

Then again, there may yet be global holocaust. The fear of attacking for fear of retaliation - the so-called deterrence theory - has always been risky and in this scenario fails, given a less and less rational and predictable world. A major world war breaks out in which hundreds of millions are killed while the follow-on economic and environmental impact threatens the survival of humanity itself.

Nuclear arms, genetically engineered biological weapons and weapons yet to be thought of combine to produce world war, with consequences that defy the imagination. It is easy to forget that in 1914 there had been no war in Europe between the great powers since 1870 and many people thought it impossible.

In all of these scenarios, the global village takes a beating. Whole blocks are burned out. With no police and no gun control, village life as we know it becomes a thing of the past.

There is a brighter, less defeatist vision, in which every effort is made to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction and to limit all other forms of armaments. War becomes as unthinkable as it is today between Germany, France and Britain. Civil wars are much reduced.

At this time of serious destabilisation of international security, it is necessary to create a different and positive dynamic. Governments and pressure groups alike should adopt as comprehensive an approach to weapons management and elimination as that used for military planning. The approach should aim to build on coalitions of like-minded states and draw in the US, Russia, China and other major powers, through the UN system when possible.

The European Union should become a world leader in weapons management and elimination. This would be a more useful means of countering the negative aspects of US policy than trying to compete militarily.

There needs to be a combination of short and long-term measures, with preliminary work begun immediately to enable the larger longer-term objectives to reach fruition.

Recommended measures:

- The following programme should provide the political context for weapons of mass destruction in South Asia and other areas of regional proliferation.
- The UK and like-minded states should implement the provisions of the biological weapons verification protocol. This would make it harder for guerrilla groups to gain access to these materials and enable future detection efforts to "eliminate potential suspects from their inquiries", so saving time and increasing confidence, experience and political momentum.
- Increase funding for the nuclear inspectorate of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Implement the agreement made in 2000 at the Non Proliferation Treaty review conference on a 13-point programme. The House of Commons should initiate a joint defence and foreign affairs committee investigation of this programme. The short-term British contribution should be to remove the warheads from Trident and put them in storage. The Trident submarines would still be exercised at sea. This measure was turned down in the Strategic Defence Review in 1997 because sending the submarines to sea would send too strong a signal. This is a strange argument, as normally deterrence is described as being all about signals.
- NPT implementation should involve the timed and phased elimination of nuclear weapons by 2020.
- A combined verification and enforcement regime for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should be developed.
- Initiate a programme to control and eliminate conventional weapons, building on the provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaties and covering naval vessels, with the objective of a verified halt to the production and trade in such weapons by 2010 and the elimination of most major weapon systems by 2020.
- No new major military production contracts should be made after 2010.
- The UK and other European states should not participate in the US missile "defence" programmes and should base their opposition on the offensive nature of these systems. At a minimum, support should be linked to full implementation of the NPT and other arms control regimes by all states, including the USA.

***ITEM 10***  
**MAKING EUROPE STRONGER**

Commentary by Karel Koster, *Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Netherlands)*

... strengthened European foreign policy has to be adjusted to fit US interests  
... even at the cost of abandoning other treaty arrangements.

I would like to draw your attention to the speech below, made by the Dutch minister of foreign affairs before the parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs in the French parliament last week.

Note carefully the appeal made for strengthening the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) while at the same time insisting it has to be done in close cooperation with the US. This position represents the 'we're all in it together' current of European opinion, which insists that the bottom line of the transatlantic argument is that the strengthened European foreign policy has to be adjusted to fit US interests (my interpretation), even at the cost of abandoning other treaty arrangements.

Note carefully the point the minister makes regarding treaty regimes: they are no longer enough to deal with rogue states which are 'outside the system'. Europe should apply its economic power to 'put pressure on countries that do not respect certain values or agreements.' Iran is specifically mentioned as a case where Europe can link market access with security. (I assume the minister wants to withhold market access to apply pressure to Iran).

Furthermore, the multilateral system is defined as one in which the US and Europe pursue shared interests, in which NATO should play a role more pro-active than in the 20th century.

The EU and US should return their focus to the bonds that link them. 'A further deepening of European integration is in the US interest as well.'

Now, in view of the fact that Holland is a loyal US ally and therefore a counterweight on the continent to Franco-German aspirations, this speech can be seen as a good illustration of the forces at work in Europe. On the one hand the support for a European CFSP, on the other the unabashed call for using European economic clout, not to counter the US, but to serve as an extension of US foreign policy, going as far as naming the first 'customer', Iran. The basic premiss is that there is a common interest which ties together the Atlantic alliance: it must continue into the 21st century as a force which can be deployed anywhere in the world.

I would say it remains to be seen how strong this particular current of opinion is in Europe: on the US side I would say it is represented by the traditional Atlanticists whose star would appear to be rapidly waning in comparison to that of the neo-conservatives.

## ***ITEM 11***

Extracts from an address by Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

"Making Europe stronger:  
our common task"

Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs  
Paris, 14 May 2003

The development of a common European foreign and security policy in keeping with Europe's enormous economic weight is long overdue. The interests of Europe, as well as the international order, require a single European voice in international relations. The EU can contribute ideas and capabilities for promoting security and stability beyond its own continent.

We must therefore develop a common vision on two key issues. First, on a joint foreign and security policy, including a defence component. Central to that vision should be the multilateral framework. With the United Nations as the jewel in the crown. Over the years, the UN has contributed unique instruments to national diplomatic tool boxes for promoting international peace and security: dispute settlement, economic sanctions; peacekeeping and reconstruction mandates; codes of conduct and inspection regimes. The UN therefore deserves to remain central to the European and American view of the international order. An international order that also includes key organisations such as NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Second, we should develop a common vision on our relationship with the US. It is essential that we better recognise our many common interests and that we deepen our transatlantic dialogue accordingly. No matter how much we invest in a multilateral framework to regulate both security and trade issues for instance, we cannot succeed without US involvement. The US needs us, just as we need the US. If the US were to walk away from the multilateral system, that system would suffer irreparably. For both the EU and the US, there is too much at stake in political and economic terms to allow the multilateral system to become obsolete.

So, you will ask, what does that European vision on security and defence and on our relationship with the US involve? It will have to be the outcome of further strategic discussions within the EU, but my answer would be that a European vision should at least be based on the following principles.

### **Security and defence**

First, if we want to make a useful contribution to the international order, we must develop a coherent foreign and security policy including a military capability. That is a strategic choice thrust upon us by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of numerous regional conflicts outside the EU. It means that, for instance, at some stage circumstances in Africa might require an EU-led peacekeeping operation. We should be prepared for that.

Second, a European defence capability should be linked to NATO and not duplicate existing structures and capabilities. We do not want an Article V for Europe. A European defence capability should allow the EU to play its role in crisis prevention and crisis management in those cases where NATO involvement is not an option. NATO remains essential and European countries need to increase their capacity to act within NATO. I might add that we Europeans should do more collectively, not in small groups of four or five.

Third, our recognition of the importance of a European defence capability should also translate into the political will to contribute resources and capabilities. Investments in both 'hard' and 'soft' security are needed.

Fourth, we must develop a common European security concept that acknowledges and addresses current deficiencies in the multilateral system. We must recognise that the case of Iraq has revealed flaws in the multilateral framework including the UN and NATO. We have to admit that traditional non-proliferation regimes have their limitations. They do not effectively address the threat of rogue states; that is, those outside the system. Supporting treaty regimes is no longer enough. Instead, if we want to respond adequately to these threats, we must work on two fronts. On the one hand, we must continue to uphold the universality of treaties and norms and to strengthen export control policies and their implementation. On the other hand, we must explore new avenues. The EU should develop a coherent non-proliferation strategy that incorporates all the instruments at its disposal: diplomatic, political, economic, financial and military as well. We need an integrated, cross-pillar approach on this issue. You will ask: what does this mean in practice? My answer is that it could mean using Europe's leverage in economic or development matters to put pressure on countries that do not respect certain values or agreements. Whether in the field of non-proliferation, terrorism, human rights or any other. Europe could use this leverage for instance, in the case of Iran, which continues to perform poorly in these areas and with which it is negotiating a trade and cooperation agreement. By linking market access with security we could create a truly coherent and effective European foreign policy.

### **Relationship with the US**

We must recognise the deficiencies in the current multilateral framework if we wish to maintain a strong partnership with the US. The multilateral system will not work without the US. For the US to work with the multilateral system, that system needs to be credible and effective. So if we agree that Europe and the US have a shared interest in a more effective multilateral system, we should ask ourselves: how can we give that system teeth. Eventually, it will be inevitable that we aim at a single European voice within the UN Security Council. I believe that the debate about a multipolar versus a unipolar world indicates that this is a problem that we need to address. We should remain focused on enhancing the multilateral framework, because that is where our interests coincide. That is also where we can negotiate our differences and settle our disputes. A strong multilateral system remains the best means for protecting the prime world interests: international peace and security. Those are the interests that impose on Europe, and not only on the United States, a responsibility for the global security. In fact, Europe is already taking that responsibility in the fight against terrorism. We will also need a discussion between Europe and the United States on the future role of NATO. I am convinced that we will have to aim for a NATO which is more pro-active than NATO in the twentieth century. Our second task vis-à-vis the US should be to convince it that while we do not always share its views (that goes for the Netherlands as well), we do believe in the importance of our relationship. Any EU efforts to acquire a role in foreign policy and defence are designed to contribute to international stability and security and not to make Europe a counterweight to the US. Some have called this an "Europe puissance". I would gladly hear your interpretation of that phrase, but I believe that an "Europe puissance" should also be an "Europe partenaire". That partnership should be reflected in active and committed diplomacy between the EU and the US. We should both engage in meaningful dialogue with an open mind. That means that we should be able to call on each other's responsibilities, notably when the Kyoto Treaty and the ICC are concerned. We should also rethink the regular EU-US



summits and make sure that they address the fundamental issues. Issues of trade and economic relations, as well as those in the security field, such as proliferation, the Middle East Peace Process and so forth.

The EU and the US should return their focus to the bonds that link them. Much as Americans must recognise that there is no such thing as “old” or “new” Europe, we should acknowledge that we may have underestimated the true trauma that the 2001 terrorist attacks have caused in the American psyche and society.

**A changing EU: bilateralism**

A further deepening of European integration is in the US interest as well. A more capable and stronger Europe can better contribute, together with the US, to effectively addressing the key issues that we all face today. ...

# NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION

## ITEM 12

### FOCUS GROUP RESULTS

Adapted from a summary by Samia Liaquat Ali Khan of the *Nuclear Weapons Awareness Project* and the *Topline Report*.

Public opinion on specific issues relating to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons was much more positive and malleable than on the issue of overall nuclear disarmament.

In order to explore the general public's awareness and understanding of the nuclear weapons issue, the *Nuclear Weapons Awareness Project* worked through *Topline* to carry out public opinion research in April 2003 during the period of the Iraq War.

The results of focus group discussions, along with research into previous surveys on the issue of public opinion and nuclear weapons provided the following important information:

- The overall awareness and knowledge of basic nuclear weapons issues was higher among men who were in general opposed to disarmament, whereas women and younger people were less informed and less defined in their opinions, but more receptive to arguments for nuclear disarmament.
- Nuclear weapons were primarily perceived to be bombs that caused huge destruction. None had heard of the term mini-nukes but understood them to mean smaller weapons that were less destructive and had an effect on a smaller area. Initially, this made some feel reassured that they were less awful than current nuclear weapons but on reflection they felt that they were worse because it would be easier for countries to justify using them.
- There was a general perception that the threat of nuclear war had receded after the end of the Cold War. Anti-nuclear weapons campaigns were felt to also have receded into the background.
- There was a perception that the world had changed after September 11, and that the threat (nuclear or otherwise) from terrorists and rogue states was now much greater.
- There was a strong perception that there was a new threat in the world after Sept 11), now reinforced by the conflict in Iraq. Although nuclear weapons were mentioned as part of the Iraq conflict (blurred with chemical/biological weapons) these were not felt to be a direct threat to the UK. However, there were concerns that it might become so. This new threat was perceived to be a considerable change from the days of the Cold War with Russia and America in deadlock. Respondents over 30, especially over 50, were highly aware of this change.
- There was a feeling that the general public's voice was not listened to. For example the marches against the war that some of the respondents supported had made no impact on the decision to go to war with Iraq.
- Respondents perceived a breakdown in unity of international collaborative institutions such as the UN and EU and a lack of power and influence against the autonomous actions of a maverick USA which had initiated the Iraq conflict against the wishes of the world. The general view was that America would do what it wanted, the UK would follow and the rest of the world would be powerless to change this. There was felt to be a lack of trust and hope in the world at the moment to make changes for the better in areas such as nuclear disarmament.
- People were surprised at the small number of states that did possess nuclear weapons, and were not very aware of the major treaties (NPT, CTBT, ABM) to control proliferation. A small minority of respondents were able to cite the full list of nuclear countries. The majority were able to cite:

Russia, America, the UK, France and possibly China as these were perceived to be major powers. Others mentioned were North Korea, Pakistan and India. Iraq was also mentioned in the context of the current crisis. When prompted with a list of nuclear weapon states respondents were surprised by the presence of Israel and also the high numbers of nuclear weapons held. This was felt to be very high in comparison to the amount of damage just one bomb could do.

- There was very limited awareness of the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, there was recollection that the US and Russia had agreed to some disarmament but no-one knew if this had actually happened.
- The majority saw a future with more nuclear weapons not less - with new and more dangerous countries obtaining them. This was felt to be in order to be on a par with the superpowers and to threaten them.
- On prompting with a list of countries who had decided not to follow their nuclear programmes or had dismantled them. The response among many was positive and offered hope but the more sceptical men stated that these countries were not major world players.
- On discussing whether global nuclear disarmament was possible, most felt the following elements had to be in place:
  - the right world leaders ready to take the initiative;
  - trust and hope;
  - most countries acting together.

There was a willingness to consider a nuclear weapons-free Europe but unilateral nuclear disarmament by the UK was for the most part dismissed as an unfeasible option.

The major barrier to people's support of nuclear disarmament was the climate of fear and instability with the ever present threat of rogue states (including the US) and terrorists, and the loose technology floating around.

The major driver towards a nuclear weapons-free world was the idea of it as an epic challenge for the human race in the 21st century to prevent our species from self destruction.

Public opinion on specific issues relating to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons was much more positive and malleable than on the issue of overall nuclear disarmament.

*The full report is available on request.*

**ITEM 13**  
**KEY**  
**INSIGHTS**

Adapted from the report of a Nuclear Weapons Strategic Development Workshop in connection with Greenpeace UK and the *Nuclear Weapons Awareness Project* Prepared by Robin Smith of *Host Universal LLP*.

May 2003

Nuclear weapons are not about security - they are about insecurity, doubt and fear. We need to unravel these deep-seated attitudes.

As the focus groups developed, several perceptions emerged which we could build on:

**Nuclear Weapons are dangerous.** If we depend on nuclear weapons we are the most likely victims of our own capability and higher on the terrorists' target list. We should stress the dangers of accident and miscalculation. With 5000 weapons on hair-trigger alert, 30,000 Hiroshimas are an accident just waiting to happen. The subsequent exposure to high levels of radiation will affect our genetic make up and that of our children.

**Nuclear weapons are irrelevant.** The UK and France spend billions on a defence system which we never intend to use and against an unknown enemy. There is also a perception that "the US looks after us". This is an view which could apply to all NATO states but does not get to the hub of the global anti-nuclear argument.

**Nuclear weapons contradict our environmental concerns.** We could paint a positive picture in which there were no atomic clouds, where we could relax with our favourite food, drink and music. We could live in a nuclear-free home in a nuclear-free world. We could positively promote a better way of living, highlighting the nuclear issue through choice, trade and consumption by favouring brands from nuclear-free countries or zones.

**Nuclear Abolition needs leadership.** Countries like the UK and France need to reassert a cultural and political identity independent of the US. If the UK renounced, or at least marginalised its nuclear weapons the pressure would be on France to follow. The next step would be a nuclear -free Europe which seized the moral high ground.

**Nuclear Weapons contribute to global problems.** American unilateralism and the Middle East situation are all to some extent underpinned by the existence of nuclear weapons. The "nuclear umbrella" is supported by a root system that undermines social and cultural structures.

**Nuclear Weapons need to be identified for what they are.** Unlike other issues, Nuclear Weapons are faceless, powerful and iconic. The majority of people don't have time or energy to engage at a deeper level. We find it difficult to resolve our acceptance of them. It seems that instinct recommends we accept them as a necessary evil of a power advantage even though it doesn't fit well with our personal values.

**Nuclear weapons are not about security** - they are about insecurity, doubt and fear. We need to unravel these deep-seated attitudes.

**Nuclear Abolition can be a vote-winner.** Several voting constituencies, such as the young, see politics as irrelevant to their lives. The challenge is to reach this powerful group by re-framing the nuclear weapons issue in the context of the environment, concerns about third world debt, and poverty, issues many of them are acutely aware of.

**Nuclear Weapons are a bad habit.** We don't need to ban the bomb instantly. We can give it up gradually. Small steps to reduce the threat of humanitarian and environmental catastrophe could include:

- We want to take those weapons off alert...
- Then we want to bring those weapons home...
- Then we want to remove the warheads...
- Then we want to dispose of them.

This is a logical pathway, easy to follow, just one step at a time (see Item 5 No 9). It is a process to remove the threat of mass destruction and radioactive wastelands from our future.